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
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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

SOVIET POLICY IN CUBA AND CHILE

by

Paul E. Sigmund

6 May 1980

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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Kathleen M. Preitz.

FOREWORD

This memorandum evolved from the Military Policy Symposium on "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failure," which was hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute in the Fall of 1979. During the Symposium, academic and government experts discussed a number of issues concerning this area which will have a continuing impact on US strategy. This memorandum considers one of these issues.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

DeWitt C. Smith, Jr.

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.,
Major General, USA
Commandant

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. PAUL E. SIGMUND is Professor of Politics and Research Associate of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. He received his bachelor's degree from Georgetown University and his master's and doctorate from Harvard where he was instructor and senior tutor in government before coming to Princeton. He has also taught as a Visiting Professor at Bryn Mawr and at universities in Ghana and Chile. Professor Sigmund is the author of numerous articles on political theory and Latin American politics and his most recent books include *Natural Law in Political Thought* (1971), *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (2nd rev. ed., 1972), *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile* (1977), and *The Multinational Corporation in Latin America: Beyond Nationalization* (forthcoming).

SOVIET POLICY IN CUBA AND CHILE

The Soviet Union is both a major power and the center of a worldwide ideological movement that claims to possess a scientific insight into the process of history. Soviet foreign policy, therefore, must carry out two potentially complicating roles. It must not only defend the security of the USSR and extend its influence and power, but it must also be able to appeal to Marxism-Leninism to explain, prescribe, and predict the course of world events. The defense of the Soviet Union, therefore, involves as well the manipulation of the official ideology to analyze current world politics and to indicate what actions should be taken in the future. This appeal to universal laws gives Soviet policy additional support from those who are attracted by its ideology but it places upon it the additional burden of interpretation of the complex and unpredictable events of international politics in terms that relate it to Marxism-Leninism.

The task has become more formidable in the last two decades as other governments have disputed the Soviet regime's claim to be the sole correct interpreter of Marxism-Leninism. Soviet ideology has responded by attempting to situate itself in a central or orthodox position and describing the other positions as errors of

the right or left. In the 1960's those erroneous positions were represented by China and Yugoslavia, and the Soviet spokesmen had to answer explicit or implicit challenges from both directions as they interpreted world events.

A further problem created by the universalistic ideological claims of Soviet policy is the conflict that often arises between the requirements of the Soviet Union as a major power involved in government-to-government relations, and those which derive from its claim to hegemony over a world doctrinal movement with adherents within each country. The needs of power politics may be difficult to reconcile with the promotion of ideologically sympathetic movements, leaders, and even governments. To be successful, Soviet policy must both promote the Soviet Union's world power, and maintain its claim to represent the "correct" interpretation of world history. One of the areas where this claim was tested and its complex effects illustrated was Latin America in the 1960's and 1970's.

In two countries, in particular, the tensions and contradictions of Soviet ideology and practice were demonstrated: Chile and Cuba. Both had relatively large and long-standing Communist parties. In both, Communist influence expanded suddenly and rapidly in ways which tested the Soviet Union's ability to respond both as a government and as an ideological center. At least from the vantage of the late 1970's those responses met with varying degrees of success which this study will attempt to evaluate.

Ideological factors were involved in the alignment of Cuba with the Soviet Union in international politics, but initially they seem to have been subordinated to calculations of national interest on both sides. Before he took power Castro himself was not a member of the Cuban Communist Party (PSP), and until mid-1958 he was regarded with hostility by the Cuban Communists. Castro now argues that at heart he was a Communist at the time that he came to power: "Although our program was not Socialist as yet, I did myself have deep Socialist and Communist convictions." Nevertheless, the evidence of his public and private statements as well as the testimony of those who were close to him at the time indicates that he did not decide to break with the United States and to align himself with the Soviet Union until some time between April and November 1959. In fact, there may have been two separate decisions—the first that a conflict with the United States was likely or even inevitable, made at the time of his trip to the

United States in the spring, and a later decision made in the fall to secure Soviet support by aligning Cuba politically with the USSR. From October 1959 Castro actively sought Soviet economic assistance, began to court the Cuban Communist Party, and stepped up the anti-American content of his public statements and actions. In mid-1960, in response to the US cut in the Cuban sugar quota, he intervened and then nationalized some and then all of US property in Cuba and secured Soviet military aid. In early 1961 he proclaimed the Cuban Revolution socialist, and by the end of the same year announced that he was a Marxist-Leninist and would be one until the last day of his life. Ideology therefore played an important role in Castro's effort to secure Soviet economic and military aid—although it seems initially to have been related in Castro's mind to a more important goal, the protection of Cuba from an American-sponsored invasion along the lines of the 1954 CIA intervention in Guatemala. In fact, of course, the measures he took to protect Cuba against such an invasion made his belief in imminent US intervention a self-fulfilling prophecy and led to a massive Soviet program of economic and military assistance to Cuba which continues to the present day.

What comes through clearly, however, in all the public statements of the Soviet leaders through this period is their caution about taking advantage of the opportunity that Castro offered. From an ideological point of view, they were aware that Castro had had no previous affiliation with international communism and was not subject to Soviet influence or control. From a pragmatic point of view, it seems that like Castro the Soviet policymakers were convinced that the United States would follow the Guatemalan scenario and intervene directly or indirectly to overthrow Castro if he continued his attacks on American interests. In addition, the beginnings of detente with the American government in the period from the Camp David meeting in September 1959 to the cancellation of the Paris Summit in May 1960 may have deterred the Soviets from taking steps in Cuba that would antagonize the United States. It is true that an economic agreement between Cuba and the USSR was signed in February 1960, and formal diplomatic relations were opened in May. However, it was only in July 1960 that the Soviets made a substantial commitment—Khrushchev's mention of Soviet rocket support "figuratively speaking," an agreement for military aid and a commitment to purchase the bulk

of the Cuban sugar crop. It was not until April 1962 that Cuba was recognized as Socialist in a Soviet publication, although Castro himself had so described Cuba's revolution a year earlier and in December 1961 had announced the beginnings of the formation of a Unified Party of the Socialist Revolution to be organized along Leninist lines. In March 1962 a new Soviet aid agreement was signed marking the firm decision by the Soviet Union to continue to support Cuba indefinitely by buying its sugar, providing it with oil, and extending military assistance free of the obligation of repayment.²

The decision to support Cuba against US pressures and then to recognize its government as ideologically aligned with the socialist camp is often described as an expensive one for the Soviet Union. The figure cited during the 1960's for Soviet aid to Cuba was \$1 million a day, and present support is much higher. The cost of the Soviet subsidy to Cuba has varied from year to year and includes general balance of payments assistance, the financing of a trade deficit with the Soviet Union, free military aid, a price paid for sugar and nickel exports that is pegged well above the world sugar price, and—since 1974—a price charged for petroleum that is below the world price (although linked to it, because it is based on average prices over the preceding 3 years). In addition, since 1973, no interest repayments are required on Cuba's debt to the Soviet Union until 1986. If one includes the forgiven interest, military aid (estimated by Jorge Dominguez at \$4.5 billion to 1975 and increased substantially since the involvement of Cuban troops in Africa), and the subsidized prices, Soviet aid to Cuba may be as high as \$4 million a day, and total assistance to Cuba over the last 20 years in excess of \$12 billion.³

The pattern of increasing Soviet support for and identification with Castro was set back in 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis. Here national interest considerations were predominant when the Soviets failed to include Castro in the negotiations with the United States over the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from the island. The fact that the Soviets had bypassed Castro in the missile crisis influenced him to adopt a more critical stance to the USSR for much of the rest of the decade. Along with Castro's efforts to establish the Cuban experience of a rural guerrilla-based revolution as a model for all of Latin America ("The Andes as the Sierra Maestra of Latin America"), it led to a period of tension in Soviet-Cuban

relations that was not fully resolved until after 1970.

That tension was increased by Castro's attacks on the pro-Moscow Communist parties in other Latin American countries, his purge of the old Communists (former members of the PSP) from the Communist Party of Cuba, and his public criticisms of the USSR for extending credits to governments such as that of Colombia that were engaged in putting down Castro-oriented guerrilla movements. When he attempted to organize a Latin American revolutionary international, the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), the Russians decided to use economic pressure to bring Castro into line. Oil deliveries to Cuba were slowed down in early 1968, and the signing of a new aid agreement was delayed. While Castro did not immediately change his tune, in August 1968 he was one of the few Communist leaders in the West to defend the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and thereafter he took a considerably less active role in promoting revolution in Latin America. In 1969 and 1970 the Cubans turned their energies inward in an unsuccessful attempt to achieve a 10 million ton sugar harvest by July 1970. When that effort failed, Castro was more amenable to Soviet advice on the domestic front, as well as internationally.⁴

Following the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest, Cuba became much more closely aligned with the Soviet Union than in the preceding decade. In 1972 Cuba joined the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and Brezhnev pronounced it "a strong constituent part of the world system of socialism." In January 1973 five long-term economic assistance agreements were announced, and in 1974 Brezhnev himself visited Cuba. In 1975 and 1977 Cuba hosted meetings of the Latin American Communist Parties. Cuban courses in Marxism-Leninism in Cuba now no longer used Cuban writers such as Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Che Guevara but translated Russian texts. The Cuban Communist Party held its first congress in December 1975, and a constitution that resembled the Soviet model was adopted in 1976. The only important institutional differences from the Soviet model were the continuing important role of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the complicated system of indirect (and on the local level, competitive) elections to the Organs of Popular Power introduced in 1976.

By the mid-1970's it was apparent that the problems in the relations of the two countries had been resolved through the discreet manipulation of Soviet military and economic assistance

and Cuba's continuing dependence upon them. The Soviet desire to reduce the burden of that assistance helps to explain the efforts made by Castro to improve relations with the United States beginning in 1974. These efforts met with a favorable US response in mid-1975 and again in early 1977, but in both cases the improvement of relations was halted by Cuban military activities in Africa.

The Cuban intervention in Africa, which clearly turned the tide in Angola and probably in Ethiopia as well, makes the Soviet expenditures of the last 20 years worthwhile. Two regimes that are oriented towards the Soviet Union are supported by Cuban armies that in turn receive substantial logistic and military equipment from the Soviet Union.

What little evidence there is on Cuban involvement in Angola seems to indicate that it was more a Cuban than a Soviet initiative. Cuba had ties with the Marxist-oriented Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) going back to 1965, and it had been far more consistent in its support for that movement than had the Soviet Union. It is possible that the Soviets suggested the initial involvement of Cuban instructors in training Angolans in the use of Soviet equipment, which began to be sent to the MPLA in late 1974. However, the Cuban decision to send 1,000 regular soldiers in late August 1975 followed a visit to Luanda by a Cuban military delegation after a reported rejection by Moscow of an MPLA request for further aid. Cuban involvement was sharply increased in early November following South African intervention. The Soviets themselves became more directly involved at the end of the year when Soviet planes began to ferry Cuban troops as part of the escalation, which quickly reached a level of 18,000 troops.

When the Cubans intervened in Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, the coordination of policies with the Soviets was earlier and more evident. Soviet troop transports brought the Cuban troops, Soviet military advisors were active, and joint planning of military involvement took place. For geopolitical reasons the Soviet interest in the Horn is greater than it is in Southern Africa, while the ideological interest of Cuba in support of the MPLA is stronger than that of the Soviet Union. The net result of the joint Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa, however, has been to reinforce the close coordination of policy that began to develop in the early 1970's, and to give the Soviet Union a roving expeditionary force in Africa.⁹

Particularly in view of the recent developments in Africa, Soviet policy towards Cuba would have to be regarded as a success. Soviet support has enabled Cuba as a Communist state to withstand US hostility for nearly 20 years. The USSR has established economic and military links that have enabled it to temper Castro's earlier ideological excesses and to induce him to follow the Soviet model. It has been able to take advantage of Castro's own revolutionary pretensions in ways which strengthen Soviet power by weakening the influence of the West in Africa. The burden of assistance to Cuba has been an investment that has paid off.

The success of Soviet Cuban policy is attributable to a combination of caution in the initial involvement with Castro, willingness to take a good deal of abuse during the period of tension and ideological difference in the middle 1960's, the ability to act quickly when opportunity presented itself (as in July 1960 after the cut in the sugar quota and in late 1975 when Soviet planes transported thousands of Cuban troops to Angola in only a few weeks), and the use of economic incentives to maintain a continuing Cuban dependence on the USSR while allowing Castro considerable leeway to pursue his own policies in the Third World. In the final analysis, the decisive instrument of control over Castro is the economic one. Even with increased Cuban trade with the West, that instrument will remain, since Cuba's two basic problems—an economy which must export low-priced sugar and import oil at increasingly high prices, and a geopolitical location in which it needs a military defender and a reliable supplier of weapons other than the United States—are not likely to be resolved in any other way.

By a curious irony, the Soviet Union's success in Cuba made it more likely to fail elsewhere in Latin America. This has been true for a number of reasons. In the first place, the existence of a Communist state in the Western hemisphere prompted United States and Latin American policymakers to regard the spread of communism in the area as a greater threat and to take measures to respond to that threat—including the modernization of the military establishment, the reform efforts associated with the Alliance for Progress, and the coordination of Western Hemisphere policies in an anti-Cuban alliance in the period between 1962 and 1975. Secondly, the economic burden of supporting Cuba has made the Soviet Union reluctant to undertake a similar burden, thus

lessening the possibility of the encouragement and support of Communist movements elsewhere in Latin America. Thirdly, at least until the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and Cuba became more closely coordinated in the 1970's, Cuban support of radical left and guerrilla movements in Latin America divided the Marxist movement and undermined the influence of the orthodox Communist parties that were loyal to Moscow. In a number of countries the radicalism espoused in theory and practice by the Castroite movements provoked the military to intervention and repression, and undermined the policy of gradualism and national democracy favored by Moscow and the parties aligned with it. The best although by no means the only example of this is Chile under Allende.

The Communist Party of Chile is one of the oldest and largest in Latin America. Its antecedent party, the Socialist Workers Party, was founded in 1912 and joined the Third International and changed its name to the Communist Party in 1921. At that time it already had elected two members in the lower house of the Chilean Congress and had strong influence—if not control—of the Chilean trade union movement. Following the change of the international Communist line in 1935, the Chilean Communists supported the Popular Front candidate for the presidency, Pedro Aguirre Cerda of the Radical Party in 1938. In 1946, they again supported a victorious candidate from the Radical Party, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, and for the first time were represented by three cabinet ministers in his government. Government participation lasted only 5 months, and by 1948 the Communists, again following the international line, were organizing strikes and violence in the copper and coal mines. This led Gonzalez Videla to outlaw them and imprison their leadership in remote areas of the north.

By the time that the Party was legalized again in 1956, it had so improved its relations with the rival Socialist Party that an electoral alliance was formed, the FRAP or Population Action Front. This coalition narrowly missed electing Salvador Allende of the Socialist Party to the presidency in 1958. Allende made another strong bid for the presidency in 1964 but he was decisively defeated by a centrist candidate, Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democrats, chiefly because of the rightist parties threw their support to Frei for fear that Allende would be elected. (Cuba also played a role in the campaign since a major feature of the right wing propaganda was

the threat that if Allende were elected Chile would become "another Cuba.")

At least from the time of the Popular Front, and certainly after the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, the Chilean Communist Party consistently supported the *via pacifica* or peaceful road to socialism in Chile. That policy was both a reflection of the party's long history of participation in Chilean democratic institutions and of the international line of the Soviet Union. In this they frequently differed from the rival Socialist Party, first organized in 1933 and frequently split thereafter, which contained a sizeable group that regarded violent revolution as the only way to achieve power for the proletariat. In 1967 the Socialist Party rejected any alliance with "reformism," as represented by both the Christian Democratic and Radical Parties, and stated that "the Socialist Party does not reject the utilization of peaceful and legal methods, such as the struggle for just demands, ideological and mass activities and political processes, but it considers that those methods alone will not lead to the conquest of power." At about the time that those words were uttered, a Castroite revolutionary group, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), was beginning to be active, organizing strikes, seizures of factories and farms, and a series of bank robberies and bomb explosions that made the issue of political violence an important one in the 1970 presidential campaign. A number of the members of the MIR were also active in the Socialist Party, and the MIR was supported and publicized in the magazine, *Punto Final*, which was believed to receive financial assistance from Cuba.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party followed a different and more sophisticated policy. It encouraged the most likely Christian Democratic candidate for the 1970 elections, Radomiro Tomic, to believe that he might secure Communist support. The result was to persuade the right, already increasingly hostile to the Christian Democrats because of the adoption of an agrarian reform law and increased taxes, to promote their own candidate in 1970, thus ensuring a three-way race which would make it easier for the candidate of the left to win than if the right and center supported a single candidate as in 1964. The Communists also took a different position from the Socialists when a Chilean military regiment revolted over salary demands in October 1969. The Communists rallied to the support of the government, while the Socialists issued

a declaration indicating that they hoped that the military would take over and carry out a revolutionary policy.

Yet despite the increasing differences between the two parties, a Popular Unity coalition was formed in late 1969 comprising not only the Communists and Socialists but the Radical Party as well and supporting a common program and the candidacy of a Socialist, Salvador Allende. This seeming political miracle was achieved largely through the efforts of the Chilean Communist Party—with the cooperation of the Soviet Union. During the 1960's the Soviets used the Chilean Party as their principal spokesman for Latin America in the international ideological battle, first against the Chinese, and then to criticize Castro's endorsement of guerrilla warfare. *Pravda*, for example, replied to Castro's 1967 attacks on the Soviet Union by printing an article by Luis Corvalan, the Secretary General of the Chilean Party, which—without mentioning Castro by name—criticized his followers as "inclined toward nationalism, adventurism, and terrorism," and accused them of attempting "to create a vanguard arbitrarily or artificially around a leader or people who individually occupy the most radical—at least in their opinions—positions and who are prepared to take one or another revolutionary action." Corvalan argued for cooperation of the left with the petty bourgeoisie through "the joint leadership of the liberation struggle of each people by (the Communist parties and other revolutionary forces) which in a certain sense share the function of the vanguard."

This is the policy that the Communist Party successfully implemented in Chile in forging the Popular Unity Alliance. It worked together with the elements in the Socialist Party led by Salvador Allende that were close to the Communists, and with the left wing of the Radical Party which had captured control of that party in 1967. (The Radicals had been allied with the right in the early 1960's but the move to the left was a response to pressure by the party youth wing which had become more sympathetic to Marxism as a result of a campaign of international travel and assistance to its leadership by the Soviet Embassy in Chile.) In the fall of 1969, the Communists succeeded in getting all three parties as well as a left-wing splinter group from the Christian Democrats and two minor groups to appoint representatives to draw up a common Popular Unity program. When it was published in December it bore a striking resemblance, sometimes word for

word, to the program adopted by the Communist Party congress held in November. By brilliant maneuvering during an additional month of bitter negotiations, the Communists then succeeded in securing Allende's nomination in mid-January.⁸

What was the role of the Soviet Union in the nomination and election of Allende? The Frei government had reestablished relations with the USSR after the 1964 election and in 1967 the Soviets had extended a \$40 million credit to his government which was never used. The 1975 US Senate Intelligence Committee report on Chile contained no figures on Soviet aid to the Allende campaign, although it mentioned, apparently relying on CIA sources, the figure of \$350 thousand in Cuban aid to Allende. Soviet aid went to the Chilean Communist Party, probably through commercial channels, rather than to Allende, since although Allende's policy was close to that of the Communists, he was a member of a rival party, and was close personally to Fidel Castro. In addition, the Soviet embassy, like the Chilean left in general, probably believed that the rightist candidate, former president Jorge Alessandri, would win.⁹

Once Allende took office in November 1970 the Soviets were faced with the question of how much assistance should be given to a regime in which a pro-Moscow party had an important role, but which was headed by a Marxist who was not a party member. Reluctant to take on a substantial economic burden, the Soviets did not rush in with large amounts of aid to Chile. In May 1971 they renewed the earlier Frei credit at a lower interest rate and granted additional funds for the purchase of machinery and the construction of a prefabricated housing plant. Later in the year they agreed to help the Chilean fishing industry, and a Soviet expert team also assisted in the evaluation of the nationalized copper mines between July and September 1971. Brezhnev noted the coming to power of a Marxist regime in Chile in his speech to the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in March 1971, but warned that Yankee imperialism sought to deprive the Chilean people of their gains. The Soviet press was favorable to the Chilean developments but careful to emphasize that the Allende headed a coalition, rather than a Communist government. Soviet commentators cited the Allende victory as a confirmation of the "peaceful road" policy of mobilization of the proletariat and a refutation of the Chinese proponents of violation as well as of unspecified, but clearly Castroite, claims for a vanguard role for students, the

intelligentsia, and other groups.¹⁰

The Soviet commentators had good reason to be cautious since the Popular Unity coalition contained representatives of views that were at considerable variance from the Soviet official position. Many of the Socialists were sympathetic to or even members of the Castroite Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) which rejected both bourgeois democracy and the Soviet model of development. The Radicals and ex-Christian Democrats, while increasingly influenced by Marxism, came from very different political traditions. In his inaugural address Allende himself promised a new model of socialism, the *via Chilena* "in democracy, pluralism, and liberty" and quoted Engels on the possibility of "a peaceful transition from the old society to the new." Even the faithful Communist Party deemphasized—although out of deference to the Soviet Union never totally abandoned—its belief in the dictatorship of the proletariat, outlining in its party program a plan for the transition to socialism which involved a plebiscite on constitutional reforms to establish a unicameral legislature and continued respect for civil liberties, pluralism, and the role of law.

Sensitive to the opposition of the military to Communist control of the interior or defense ministries, Allende gave only the ministries of labor, finance, and public works to Communist representatives. However, the party had influence elsewhere as well, since the Popular Unity agreements had specified that, in order to avoid the creation of party fiefdoms, the deputies to each minister should come from a different party. Communists also headed the economics ministry after December 1972. The Popular Unity parties had also agreed that the interparty Political Command set up during the campaign would continue to meet to discuss and approve major policy decisions of the president. When a split developed fairly early in Allende's term between the Radicals, the Communists, and Allende himself on one side, and the Socialists and the ex-Christian Democratic MAPU on the other (MAPU itself later split into two along the same lines) over the pace and method of the changes to be carried out by the government, Allende allowed both sides, in effect, to exercise a veto power over his policies.

The differences between the two groups were focused first on the issue of violence. Shortly after his election Allende pardoned the members of the MIR who had been imprisoned for various acts of violence under the Frei regime. In the south the MIR and related

groups led seizures of 1,458 farms in Allende's first year. A month after his election there were street battles between the Communists and the MIR in Concepcion and in January in interviews with the French pro-Castro philosopher, Regis Debray, Allende argued that he was observing legality "for the time being" and stated that his differences with revolutionaries like Che Guevara were only "tactical."¹¹ Like his government, Allende was himself divided between a belief that violence was necessary to effect genuine changes, and a commitment to the observance of "bourgeois legalism" as the only way to achieve change in Chile, given its democratic tradition, the provisions of the Statute of Democratic Guarantees that he had accepted as a condition of his election, and the fact that respect for the constitutional rules of the game was the only thing that prevented many of the leaders of the armed forces from staging a coup.

The Communists, recognizing that they would be the first to be suppressed in the event of military intervention, agreed with Allende in this analysis. In public commentaries by the international Communist press and in the Communist Chilean daily, *El Siglo*, there was little discussion of the possibility of military intervention. Allende's skill in handling the military, and in particular his apparent conversion of General Carlos Prats from opposition and suspicion to support, had allayed fears of such intervention once the crucial period before the congressional vote of later October 1970 had passed. Most of the criticism by the Communists was directed at the extreme left, the MIR and Socialist Party, now dominated by Senator Carlos Altamirano who made no secret of his belief in the inevitability and desirability of violence.

The Allende government reestablished relations with Cuba, broken off in 1964 as a result of a vote of the Organization of American States but Castro followed a low-profile policy. He did not come to Allende's inauguration as some believed he would, and he wrote Allende urging him to keep on good terms with the United States. Yet there was no doubt where the Cubans stood in the debate over the role of violence. They had supported the MIR from the beginning, they established a large embassy in Chile which included Allende's Cuban son-in-law and Cuban military experts gave instruction in the use of modern firearms to Allende's personal bodyguard—the so-called GAP or Group of Personal Friends, and to Allende himself.

The most spectacular example of Cuban actions that undermined Allende's claim to the strict observance of legality took place in March 1972, when 13 large wooden crates from Cuba bypassed customs examination and were taken from the airfield on orders of the interior ministry. A customs official reported this to the Congress, the government made contradictory statements about the contents of the crates, and the armed forces began, we now know, for the first time to give active consideration to the possibility of a coup. After September 1973 the Pinochet government published photostatic copies of a list of the contents found in the apartment of the Communist Director of *Investigaciones*. The crates had contained submachine guns, matching pistols, revolvers, and ammunition.¹²

By early 1972 a process of political polarization had set in—with the centrist Christian Democrats now working regularly with the rightist National Party in the Congress to oppose the Allende government. In January two by-elections in the south indicated increasing opposition to the government. In Allende's first year in office, the international reserves built up by the preceding government had been spent, and what had seemed initially to be a successful economic policy began in his second year as president to produce shortages and inflationary pressures which led to a runaway inflation later in the year.

The only ones in the Allende coalition to recognize the seriousness of the situation were the Communists. In a secret report prepared for a meeting of the Popular Unity parties in early February 1972, the Communists blamed the violence preached and practiced by the extreme left for the recent electoral losses, predicted that during 1972 there would be "strong inflationary pressures that could make our situations acute," and called for a dialogue with the Christian Democrats in order to prevent the consolidation of their emerging alliance with the right. (They also took credit for having pursued such a policy before the 1970 election, thus making Allende's election possible.)¹³

Partly as a result of Communist pressure within the Popular Unity coalition, negotiations were initiated between the Christian Democrats and moderate members of the Allende government. An initial agreement was reached in March, but the left wing of the Popular Unity Political Command vetoed the accord, leading the Left Radical group that had engineered the agreement to resign from the government, and in July to join the opposition. A second

set of negotiations in June reached partial agreement, but they were broken off by the Christian Democrats in early July when the time limit they had set in anticipation of an impending by-election expired. In retrospect, this turns out to have been the last chance to prevent the polarization that eventually resulted in the 1973 coup. Here as earlier, the Communist Party was right in recognizing that an agreement with the Christian Democrats was necessary to save the constitutional order, and their own freedom to function in a democratic society. The Christian Democratic candidate in 1970, Radimiro Tomic, also recognized this, but by 1972 he was pessimistic about the possibilities of reaching agreements that could have been arrived at earlier.¹⁴

Yet at the same time that the Communists were attempting to keep the opposition divided, they were working to unite the Popular Unity coalition. They even proposed the creation of a single Popular Unity party, but their proposal received no support from the other parties which feared that such a party would be dominated by the Communists because of their superior organizing ability and substantial membership.

Besides the increasing political polarization between the two groups of parties, and between the president on one side and the opposition-dominated Congress on the other, the other major problem was the economy. In September 1972 the annual inflation rate reached 114 percent and industrial production began to drop. (It continued to do so until the September 1973 coup.) The seizures in the countryside had also cut into food production, and the declining price of copper as well as the difficulties of securing loans from New York banks created problems in securing foreign exchange necessary to pay for the estimated \$500 million in food imports in 1972.

One might have expected Allende to turn to the Soviet Union for help in this situation, but he was remarkably slow to do so. In fact, most of the short-term credits for Chile came from countries like Canada, Australia, and Argentina for the importation of wheat and meat. A major effort to secure Soviet assistance was not made until Allende's trip to Moscow in December 1972. As a result of the trip, Allende received \$30 million for the purchase of food and cotton, and a \$20 million increase in earlier short-term loans. (Other reports indicated a figure of \$100 million.) It was also announced in Santiago that the Soviet Union had granted \$108 million for long-term projects, but some of these had been included

in earlier announcements. The Moscow trip ended in a communique which also promised Soviet support for Chilean power production and the expansion of the fishing industry.¹⁵

What comes through clearly is that nothing like the general balance of payments support that Cuba enjoyed was ever considered by the Soviets for Allende. They were willing to approve some individual projects, and give some food aid, but not the massive assistance that Castro received. In actual fact, the Chilean debt to all the Communist countries, including China, increased from \$14 million in 1970 to only \$40 million in 1973, at the same time that its debt to other Latin American countries and Spain increased from \$9 million to nearly \$150 million.¹⁶ The Soviet Union bought copper from Chile and exported machinery and food, chiefly condensed milk, wheat, and meat, but the total volume of trade with Chile did not expand to anything like the degree of the expansion of Soviet trade with Cuba in the early 1960's. Chile's basic trading partners were still in the West, including, despite all of Allende's talk of an "invisible blockade," the United States.¹⁷

The breach between the Communists, the Radicals, and Allende on one side, and the Socialists and other left groups on the other, widened in late 1972 as Popular Unity debated what to do with factories which had been taken over by the workers during the month-long truckers' strike in October 1972. In January 1973 the Communist economics minister, Orlando Millas, sent a bill to Congress to regularize the legal situation of the factories that had been taken over in the truckers' strike on a supposedly temporary basis. This provoked a furious debate among the Socialists over whether any of the factories should be handed back to the owners. The Communists, calling on the government to "consolidate" in order to advance,¹⁸ favored taking over only those on the original government list of firms to be expropriated, and setting up a commission to study what should be done with the others. This provoked one wing of the MAPU to issue a report accusing the Communists and Allende of adopting a "state capitalist" position which was not fundamentally different from that of the opposition. Calling on the workers to "advance without compromise" and claiming to have developed a new political form of "people's power," the Socialists and the MIR organized worker belts (*cordones*), commune commands, and camps which were outside of the regular governmental structure. Again, the Communists

opposed this tactic, both because of its adverse economic effects (Corvalan described it as "suicidal" in an open letter to the Socialists in February) and because it meant that the transition to socialism was running out of control.

A revolt by the Second Armored Regiment at the end of June 1973 was put down by General Prats, but not before the Communist-dominated trade union federation had attempted to outflank the Socialists by ordering the occupation of more factories—leading to the rekindling of the controversy over the legal status of the worker takeovers. In July as political polarization intensified and the inflation rate reached 323 percent, the Communists reverted to support for Chilean constitutionalism and made a last attempt to stave off the coup which now seemed only a matter of time. Timing their campaign to coincide with an appeal by the Chilean bishops for a "political truce," the Party initiated a campaign with the slogan, "No, to civil war." The efforts of the Communists and the bishops produced a series of fruitless discussions between Allende and the head of the Christian Democrats at the end of July, and a secret meeting in August between the two at the residence of Cardinal Silva. Castro sent a letter to Allende supporting the dialogue but urging him to resist the pressure of the opposition, telling him: "Your decision to defend the (revolutionary) process with firmness and honor even at the cost of your own life will draw all forces capable of fighting to your side."¹⁸

By August, Chile was an armed camp. The military intelligence services had detected the beginning of arms training by the Popular Unity parties, and the armed forces began to carry out raids seeking arms caches—although without much success.¹⁹ The MIR published a leaflet with the heading "Soldier, disobey your officers who are inciting a coup." The classic precipitant of the *coup d'etat*, the threat to the military monopoly of the use of force, was heading Chile directly to a military takeover.

When the coup took place on September 11, the MIR leadership went underground and Senator Altamirano slipped out of the country—to emerge later in Cuba. The top Communist leaders were arrested and detained on an island in the south, and the military attempted to destroy the infrastructure of the party, although their most intense efforts were aimed at the *violentistas* of the MIR.

After the coup, the military claimed to have saved the country

from Communism and civil war. They were more persuasive on the latter point than on the former, since at least in the short run it is difficult to construct a scenario for a Communist takeover in Chile in 1973 as long as the Armed Forces remained unsympathetic to Marxism. (In the longer run, however, the Communists never denied that their ultimate objective was the dictatorship of the proletariat.)

Castro proclaimed that the coup demonstrated that there was no alternative but armed revolutionary struggle, while Radio Moscow and exiled members of the Chilean Communist Party stressed the coalition nature of the Allende regime and its internal divisions, as well as the lack of support for it by the middle class. Surprisingly little attention was given to the US role. As they had done during the Allende period, the Soviet writers emphasized that the Allende regime was not a socialist one but a national democratic revolution which was preparing the transition to socialism. They also noted that a further problem of the Allende regime was that the Communist Party was not able to play a "vanguard" role.²⁰

Volodia Teitelboim, a Communist senator who was out of Chile at the time of the coup, became the Chilean Communist spokesman in exile. Writing from Moscow, his verdict on the coup directly contradicted that of Castro. He denied that the coup refuted the Chilean Communist position that "a people can come to power without recourse to arms." Declaring that "Marxism-Leninism envisages both the armed and nonarmed path to power," with the later defined as "a process of aggravated class struggle but without civil war," he blamed the failure of Popular Unity on "the existence of two opposite trends within the Popular Unity government." One of them "guided by Leninist theory" and acting in accordance with the "objective laws of social development . . . envisaged uniting the people around the working class, the mainstay of the revolution" while the other "took a sectarian attitude" producing "endless futile discussions," which paralyzed the government, and "isolated the working class from its allies."²¹

What should be the verdict on the success or failure of Soviet policy towards Chile? It is clear that the USSR was always somewhat dubious about the chances of success of the Allende experiment and unwilling to make a major economic commitment to it. That doubt was justified in the event, since Allende and the heterogeneous coalition that he headed were not responsive to Soviet policies and did not, in the Soviet view, offer enough in the

way of a political return to compensate for the economic and political risks involved in a major commitment. Military guarantees made no sense, given the attitude of the United States and the Chilean military, and economic support would have required massive quantities of wheat, oil, and meat that the Soviet Union did not have, or hard currency that it could not spare. It is true that a successful Chilean experiment in Marxist pluralism would have had a major impact on Western Europe, but the Soviets had never favored such a system except as a transitional stage, with a preponderant influence by the Communist Party, towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. What appeared at the time to be a movement to the left in surrounding countries such as Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina turned out to be evanescent, and there was little geopolitical advantage to a Marxist government located about as far from Moscow as any government could be. Combined with the domestic correlation of forces—Allende's status as a minority president, opposition control of the congress and courts, the influence of the opposition media, and strong US pressure—there was little to attract the Soviets to a major commitment. The policy that the Soviets and the Communist Party of Chile pursued, avoidance of violence and attempts to compromise with the centrist Christian Democrats,²² was in retrospect the only possible one, but it was sabotaged from the outset by the extreme left. (The leading senatorial spokesman for the extreme left, Carlos Altamirano, has now recognized that his policy was erroneous, and has announced his commitment to democratic socialism.)

After the coup, the Soviet Union and orthodox Communist Parties around the world were able to extract major political benefits from it since it spurred the formation of anti-facist solidarity committees and rallies for Chilean democracy all over the world, as Chile became "the Spain of the 1970's." It put the Communists in the role of defenders of democracy, and seemed to confirm the argument that capitalism and "fascist" repression were inevitably connected.

If we compare the policies that the Soviet Union followed in Cuba and Chile—two very different situations—we find some interesting common elements. In both cases, a large and homegrown Communist Party played an important role in increasing Soviet influence, although the relationships between the PSP and Castro and the Chilean Communist Party and Allende were very different. In both cases, Soviet policy makers at the

outset were cautious and unwilling to make major commitments, regarding Latin America as located within the American sphere of influence and fearful that other goals in Moscow's relationship with the United States would be jeopardized. There is evidence in both cases of the tension that has always existed in Marxist-Leninist doctrine between a belief in violent revolution as the principal method of historical change and a willingness to adjust one's methods to historical circumstances—in particular to the possibilities of expansion of influence through "bourgeois" democratic methods. In both cases too, policy makers judged the future by the past—with Guatemala playing a major role in the thinking of those involved with Cuba, and Cuba playing such a role in Chile.

There are important differences as well. The Soviet policy instrument of economic and military assistance was able to produce over the long run a relatively smooth relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba, while there was not much hope that either could be effective in Chile. Cuba was a strategic success at least after the settlement of the missile crisis, but it was a source of ideological difficulty until the 1970's. The Allende experience in Chile, on the other hand, confirmed the Soviet ideological approach, but marked a substantial strategic setback in Latin America. However, it took 15 years for the Cuban relationship to sort itself out, and in the Chilean case, the long-term impact of the 1973 coup on Soviet power and influence is still to be measured.

This essay began with the observation that Soviet policy towards Cuba and Chile could be evaluated in two ways. It can be discussed in the conventional manner, assessing how it served to advance or impede Soviet security and national interests and how these related to the perceived interests of other governments or Communist parties. It can also be used to evaluate the Soviet claim that Marxism-Leninism provides a scientific insight into historical processes, enabling those who espouse it to explain, prescribe, and predict the course of national and international politics.

Taking the two points in reverse order, we can say that Soviet ideology was quite inadequate as a guide to the future in Cuba and Chile. Soviet policymakers did not expect the sudden turn to the left in the two countries, and they were initially very cautious in the policies which they adopted towards them. Yet in both cases, they were aided by a domestic Communist party which assisted them in evaluating events and deciding on policy. The policies which they

ultimately adopted were confirmed by subsequent events—in the Cuban case in ways that decisively advanced Soviet strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere and Africa, and in the Chilean case in ways that confirmed the wisdom of Moscow's original cautious assessment of the Allende experiment and that will provide grist for the Soviet propaganda and organizational mill for years to come.

On the other hand, it is also evident from the two cases that when Soviet national interests and those of other countries or parties are seen to conflict, the Soviet interest is immediately preferred. Thus, Castro was ignored in the 1962 missile crisis, the Latin American Communist parties received very little assistance during their polemic with Castro, and the Chilean Communists and their fellow-traveler, Allende, received hardly more than token economic aid. While there were instances of Soviet initiatives that involved risk—the commitments to Castro in 1960, the missile emplacements in 1962, and the African adventures of the mid-1970's, the overall Soviet pattern has been one of conservatism, caution, and preference for gradual change. Whether that pattern is now beginning to change is a question still to be answered.

ENDNOTES

1. Barbara Walters, "An Interview with Fidel Castro," *Foreign Policy*, No. 28, Fall 1977, p. 34.

2. On the complex interplay between the Soviet Union, Castro, and the Cuban Communist Party (PSP) in this period, see Edward Gonzalez, "Castro's Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals, and the Soviet Response," *World Politics*, Vol. XXI, October 1968, pp. 39-68; as well as his "Relationship with the Soviet Union" in *Revolutionary Change in Cuba*, ed. by Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, pp. 81-105. Hugh Thomas, *Cuba, The Pursuit of Freedom*, New York: Harper and Row, 1971, chs. 105-106 provide the best history of the period. On the Soviet preference for a gradual transition to communism in Latin America through "an extended period of national democracy" see Herbert Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXI, No. 1, April 1967, p. 80.

3. On Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba, see the articles by Jorge Perez-Lopez, Jorge Dominguez, and Carmelo Mesa-Lago in *Cuba in the World*, ed. by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979. Overpricing of Soviet exports may reduce the size of the subsidiary somewhat—but it is still very large—and growing much larger as a result of support for Cuban troops in Africa.

4. On Soviet Cuban-relations in the mid-1960's see D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism in Latin America*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969; Jacques Levesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, New York: Praeger, 1978; the documents in *Models of Political Change in Latin America*, ed. by Paul E. Sigmund, New York: Praeger, 1970, pp. 101-111; and in *Marxism in Latin America*, (revised edition), ed. by Luis E. Aguilar, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, pp. 252-258. Castro's August 1968 speech was not the unqualified endorsement of Soviet policy that was widely reported. In it he said that "the violation (of Czech sovereignty) was, in fact, of a flagrant nature" although "a bitter necessity," and he once again criticized the necessity," and he once again criticized the Soviet Union for "drawing closer economically, culturally, and politically to the oligarchic governments of Latin America which are not merely reactionary governments and exploiters of their people but also shameless accomplices in the imperialist aggressions against Cuba." The evidence on Soviet pressure on Castro through a slowdown in oil deliveries appears in *Granma Weekly Review*, January 5, 1968, p. 3; *Granma*, Feb. 11, 1968, p. 9; and in Jorge Dominguez, *Cuba, Order and Revolution*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 162-163.

5. On Cuba and the Soviet Union in Africa, see Abraham Lowenthal, "Cuba's African Adventure," *International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Summer 1977, pp. 3-10; Gerald Bender, "Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties," *Foreign Policy*, No. 31, Summer, 1978, pp. 3-30; Jorge Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Fall 1980, pp. 83-108; John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, Vol. II, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978, pp. 225-229, 272-281. Castro himself argued in the Barbara Walters' interview (note 1) that Cuba did not decide to send in military units until November 5, 1975, because of the South African invasion that began on October 23. As noted above, however, 1,000 regular troops had arrived in Angola in late September. For a chronology and an

analysis that relates the initial Cuban involvement to the need for assistance to the Angolans in the use of Soviet weaponry, see Richard Henry Weiss, "Cuban Involvement in Angola: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Revolutionary State," Senior Thesis, Princeton University, 1979.

6. "The Socialist Party against Reformism," translated by the editor in *Models of Political Change in Latin America*, ed. by Paul E. Sigmund, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970, p. 327. On the earlier history of the Chilean Communist Party, see Robert Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957, and Ernst Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism in Chile*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1965, ch. 3.

7. Luis Corvalan, "The Alliance of Revolutionary Anti-imperialist Forces in Latin America" in Sigmund, *Models*, p. 110. Note that Corvalan seems to compromise on the classic Marxist-Leninist doctrine that the Communist Party alone is the vanguard of the proletariat.

8. Allende was named the Socialist candidate for the negotiations by one vote—his own. For an account of the Popular Unity negotiations, and a comparison of its program with that of the Communist Party, see Paul E. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, pp. 88-91, 302-303. The Communist role is analyzed in Eduardo Labarca Goddard, *Chile at Rojo*, Santiago: Universidad Tecnica del Estado, 1971. See also Luis Corvalan, *El Camino de Victoria*, Santiago: Impresora Horizonte, 1971, pp. 295ff. It is probably not a coincidence that in his inaugural address Allende quoted a passage from Engels on the possibility of a peaceful evolution to socialism that was central to the argument made by a leading Uruguayan Communist, Rodney Arismendi, in his recent book, *Lenin La Revolucion y America Latina*, Montevideo: Pueblos Unidos, 1970.

9. In an effort to influence the election in Alessandri's direction, *El Mercurio*, a widely-read and respected conservative newspaper in Santiago, printed in serial form the papers of Vladimir Kunakov, a Chilean citizen who had acted as a spy for the Soviet Embassy from 1968 until his death in March 1970. See *El Mercurio*, August 23-29, 1970. They mention the commercial firms through which the Communist Party was supported, but reveal a good deal of tension between the Embassy and the Party over Czechoslovakia despite the fact that the Chilean Party supported the Soviet intervention. One of Kunakov's principal duties was reporting to the Embassy on the attitudes of the Party leaders towards the Soviet Union. For the figure on Cuban aid to Allende, see US Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities, Covert Action*, December 4-5, 1975, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 167. The report estimates that the US Government spent \$800 thousand to \$1 million against Allende (including the attempt to promote a military coup in October) and that US businesses spent another \$700 thousand.

10. See reviews of Soviet reactions in Roger Hamburg, "The Soviet Union and Latin America," in *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations*, ed. by Roger Kanet, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974, at pages 190-195, and Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, *Soviet Penetration of Latin America*, Miami: University of Miami Monographs in International Affairs, 1975, ch. IV.

11. Regis Debray, *Conversations with Allende*, New York: Pantheon, 1971, pp. 97 and 77.

12. *Libro Blanco del Cambio de Gobierno en Chile*, Santiago: Editorial Lord

Cochrane, 1973, pp. 103-108. See also page 8 for a photograph of Allende receiving machine gun training from a Cuban instructor at his personal retreat.

13. "Los comunistas analizan la situación política," *El Siglo*, February 3, 1972, p. 4, reported in INDAL, *Partido Comunista de Chile*, Dossier No. 9, October 1974, pp. 131-138.

14. See Radomiro Tomic, "One View of Chile's Present Political and Economic Situation," in *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, ed. by J. Ann Zammit, Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, pp. 31-40. For a chillingly accurate forecast made by Tomic in October 1972 of the results of the breakdown of the constitutional order, see Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, p. 187.

15. Sigmund, *Overthrow of Allende*, p. 194; Goure and Rothenberg, *Soviet Penetration*, pp. 142-143; *The New York Times*, December 2, 1972.

16. CIAP Subcommittee on Chile, Interamerican Economic and Social Council, Organization of American States, *El Esfuerzo Interno y las Necesidades de Financiamiento Externo para el Desarrollo de Chile*, January 28, 1974, p. V-9.

17. New aid loans from the United States declined to \$5.5 million under Allende and short-term credits from US banks dropped from \$219 million to \$27 million but Chile still received \$10 million worth of food under the Food for Peace Program from the United States and replaced US loans with credits from Western Europe, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Allende claimed that it was impossible to get spare parts from the US copper companies, but secured them from Canada and Japan. See Paul E. Sigmund, "The Invisible Blockade and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 2, January 1974, pp. 322-340. On Soviet food exports to Chile, see Goure and Rothenberg, *Soviet Penetration*, p. 144.

18. The letter in Castro's handwriting is published in the *Libro Blanco*, p. 101-102. In the UN debates after the coup, it was recognized as genuine by the Cuban representative. For the Communist position on people's power (*poder popular*) see Genaro Arriagada, *De la Via Chilena a la Via Insurreccional*, Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1974, pp. 296ff.

19. *Libro Blanco* includes (pp. 192 and 197) what appear to be authentic documents that indicate the beginnings of arms training by MAPU in December 1972 and the Radicals in July 1973. More questionable is a document dated June 30, 1973, instructing all Communist Party members in Santiago to secure arms and to evacuate the upper class *barrio alto* in case of conflict, and gratuitously stating that "a specialized team of the Communist Party will physically eliminate the leaders of the opposition— which the membership should keep strictly secret" (p. 48). Also included in the *Libro Blanco* are excerpts from a Plan Z of unidentified origin calling for the assassination of the leaders of the armed forces on September 19th (pp. 53-65).

20. See reviews of Soviet reactions by Goure and Rothenberg, pp. 107-125, and Roger Hamburg, "The Lessons of Allende," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXVII, January-February 1978, pp. 71-76. (Hamburg is preparing a monograph on the subject.) For a comparison of the interpretation of the Allende experience by the Italian and Soviet Communist Parties, see Joan Barth Urban, "Socialist Pluralism in Soviet and Italian Communist Perspective: The Chilean Catalyst," *Orbis*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 482-509.

21. Velodia Teitelboim, "The Failure in Chile and the Future of a Strategy," *Political Affairs*, August 1974, excerpted in *Marxism in Latin America* (revised edition), ed. by Luis Aguilar, pp. 329-333. See also summaries of other articles by Teitelboim in Goure and Rothenberg, pp. 109 and 119.

22. The only evidence for pursuit of a different policy is the Chilean Communist Party support for the factory seizures of June 1973, the assertion by Chilean naval intelligence after the coup that Russian advisors at the prefabricated housing plant near Valparaiso were giving guerrilla training to some of the workers (*Ercilla*, October 10-16, 1973), and the somewhat questionable Communist document published in the *Libro Blanco* (note 19).

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21. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This memorandum considers Soviet influence in Latin America in the 1960's and 1970's. In two countries, in particular, the tensions and contradictions of Soviet ideology and practice were demonstrated: Cuba and Chile. Both had relatively large and long-standing Communist parties. In both, Communist influence expanded suddenly and rapidly in ways which tested the Soviet Union's ability to respond both as a government and as a ideological center. At least from the vantage of the late 1970's those responses met with varying degrees of		

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success which this memorandum attempts to evaluate.

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